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Abstract
All sciences make mistakes, and epidemiology is no exception. I have chosen 7 illustrative mistakes
and derived 7 solutions to avoid them. The mistakes (Roman numerals denoting solutions) are:
1. Failing to provide the context and definitions of study populations. (I Describe the study
population in detail)
2. Insufficient attention to evaluation of error. (II Don't pretend error does not exist.)
3. Not demonstrating comparisons are like-for-like. (III Start with detailed comparisons of groups.)
4. Either overstatement or understatement of the case for causality. (IV Never say this design
cannot contribute to causality or imply causality is ensured by your design.)
5. Not providing both absolute and relative summary measures. (V Give numbers, rates and
comparative measures, and adjust summary measures such as odds ratios appropriately.)
6. In intervention studies not demonstrating general health benefits. (VI Ensure general benefits
(mortality/morbidity) before recommending application of cause-specific findings.)
7. Failure to utilise study data to benefit populations. (VII Establish a World Council on
Epidemiology to help infer causality from associations and apply the work internationally.)
Analysis of these and other common mistakes is needed to benefit from the increasing discovery
of associations that will be multiplying as data mining, linkage, and large-scale scale epidemiology
become commonplace.
Introduction: epidemiological mistakes and 
solutions
All sciences and scientists make mistakes, and epidemiol-
ogy and epidemiologists (including this writer) are no
exception. Epidemiological mistakes may maim and kill,
and sometimes the toll can be massive. The contemporary
exemplar of this is hormone replacement therapy (HRT),
used by millions of women in the hope of reducing cancer
and heart disease [1,2]. Fortunately, the saving of life and
health benefits arising from epidemiology, despite its mis-
takes, seem to outweigh the harm. The lives saved from
epidemiological studies of tobacco, for example, possibly
outweigh all our mistakes, and the information will save
even more lives as tobacco control spreads globally, par-
ticularly in Asia[3]. This judgement, however, needs and
deserves quantitative evaluation.
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Mistakes in epidemiology are mostly simple, but they are
often challenging, though only occasionally impossible,
to avoid. Every study presents a dilemma on the balance
between efficiency and accuracy. More generally, we have
the puzzle of why mistakes continue to occur despite
much guidance. Mistakes are rarely deliberate, and usually
avoidable. I have chosen seven mistakes to illustrate how
epidemiology goes wrong, and seven solutions are
derived (these numbers were chosen to match the title of
the presentation on which this paper is based - seven sins
and seven commandments of epidemiology - which
chimes with our wider culture on right and wrong). My
chosen seven mistakes are a sample on which I have been
reflecting [4], and against which I have personally battled,
but there is scope for several papers of this kind. Phillipe
Grandjean's paper on the seven deadly sins of environ-
mental epidemiology covered human frailties, [5] so this
one focuses on the scientific discipline, although the two
perspectives overlap. Grandjean constructed his paper
around the original sins (gluttony, sloth etc.) as shown in
Table 1. The seven mistakes I have chosen illustrate some
of the dilemmas facing all of us, and they focus us on prin-
ciples. These mistakes call for better education and train-
ing. I have chosen one or two examples for illustration.
Analysis
Mistake 1: Failing to provide the context and definitions of 
study populations
Textbooks tell us that epidemiology is a population sci-
ence, though few discuss why [6], leading me to write a
full chapter on the topic in my own textbook [6,7]. Popu-
lations differ by place, their characteristics and time. The
results may not generalise easily between populations,
within subgroups of the same population, or within the
same population at different times. This applies particu-
larly to the burden of disease and risk factors, but also to
causal understanding. Thus, understanding the kind of
population studied is essential. There is nothing more ele-
mentary in epidemiology but, nonetheless, this is possibly
the commonest of the seven mistakes chosen for this
paper.
The solution is:
(I) State the location and timing of fieldwork and describe
the study population in detail, especially age, sex, socio-eco-
nomic status and ethnic composition.
Rarely, the study location might be disguised to hide the
identity of study participants, especially for rare, stigmatis-
ing conditions. If so, authors should use their discretion
on the level of detail and, exceptionally, even hide the
location. Authors need to justify the decision and inform
the reader of why they took it. Otherwise, contextual
detail must be given. Timing of fieldwork is essential for
examining time trends as the date of publication is a sorry
substitute. It is not enough to say the study was done in
the USA or even New York, except when the work was
indeed national and/or city-wide, respectively. Authors
should be specific about the district of the city. Without
the study population's details it is not possible to draw
appropriate conclusions. This is obvious in relation to
applied epidemiology used for health service/public
health purposes. It also applies to causal research, where
understanding the biological processes, presence of co-
risk factors and competing risks of disease and death are
so important to generalisation. An association may vary in
its strength in different populations, reflecting the pres-
ence or absence of co-factors.
Examples
When answering specific questions, it is surprising how
sparse the scientific literature is, and this applies particu-
larly in low income countries as well as in relation to
minority populations within the high income countries.
As shown in table 2, in recent reviews my colleagues and
I have found that information on time of fieldwork was
present in every North American and European cardiovas-
cular cohort study we examined, [8] but missing in a high
proportion of studies on minorities and in West Africa [9-
12]. By contrast, the cardiovascular cohort studies, partic-
ularly those in Europe, were lacking in information on the
ethnic composition of the samples. Absence of such
basics, especially as investigators move posts and are not
always easy to contact, can undermine interpretation of
individual publications and weaken both traditional and
systematic reviews.
Mistake 2: Insufficient attention to evaluation of error
Measurement is always imperfect in the empirical sci-
ences, and especially in humans. The most fundamental
error is mismeasurement, which is ubiquitous and often
unavoidable. We have motivations to ignore error. We
want a rapid, inexpensive and conclusive outcome. Seek-
ing out and rectifying errors requires scarce time and
resources, and funding (for pilot studies, for example) is
not easy to obtain. We want (and need) publication.
Table 1: Common vices in environmental epidemiology
Vice
Pride Preoccupation with methodology
Envy Failure to recognize achievements by others
Wrath Self-righteous intimidation of competitors
Lust Desire for academic honors
Gluttony Excessive craving for publications
Greed Benefit from vested interests
Sloth Callousness to injustice
Extract from Grandjean, P Epidemiology, Volume 19, Number 1, January 
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While acknowledging errors and limitations is good
scholarship, openness can lead to rejection of manuscripts
during review, particularly if errors could, in retrospect,
have been avoided. Where publication is associated with
direct financial rewards and prestige, the temptation to
gloss over errors is strong. The solution arising is, again, a
basic one, but one that needs reinforcement, for it is
widely ignored.
Solution II: Don't act as if measurement error does not exist. If
possible quantify it. If not, identify that as a limitation of the
work. (Remember that lack of cross-cultural validity of meas-
ures may lead to serious errors.)
Examples
Our potential actions are to ignore errors, acknowledge
them but do nothing, make qualitative adjustments in the
interpretation - probably through qualifying words such
as 'may', 'could', etc. (this is perhaps the commonest
response) - or make quantitative adjustments to summary
measures. Maldonado argues that making no quantitative
adjustment equates to the assumption that the study's
imperfections have no important impact on study results,
which is mostly untrue. He demonstrates how to quanti-
tatively adjust relative risk using error terms [13]. Such
adjustments increase the uncertainty of the summary
measures (widening confidence intervals). This makes
conclusions more tentative, which is good science but
potentially an obstacle to publication and implementa-
tion.
The need for cross-cultural validity of self report data is
self evident but often ignored [14]. It is less obvious, and
more controversial, that the interpretation of physical
measures such as BMI, waist, birth weight, and fetal and
childhood growth may differ across different populations,
particularly by ethnic group [15]. The differential per-
formance of clinical measures, such as the electrocardio-
gram, is reasonably well established, but has not led to
any substantial programme of research to improve mat-
ters [16]. The cross-cultural, cross-national validity of bio-
chemical measures, for example, the biological effect of a
particular level of cholesterol, and normal values of glu-
cose during the oral glucose tolerance test, has hardly
been discussed.
Implementing this solution is a major challenge. The mis-
take is to ignore the problem.
Mistake 3: Not demonstrating comparisons are like-for-
like, and the problem of confounding
Epidemiologists are fortunate that they study humans.
This privilege comes at a price: the (relatively) easy route
to causal knowledge through experimentation is largely
barred for ethical reasons; the scientific principle of split-
ting a tissue specimen or a sample of cloned/inbred ani-
mals into a control or study group, permitting rigorous
like-for-like comparisons, is rarely possible.
The closest practical alternatives in human epidemiology
are randomised controlled trials, but even these have
error. Even if like-for-like comparison is achieved by ran-
domisation and blinding (both are needed), many factors
including the selection of populations, may preclude
causal inference to the target population, i.e. external
validity. Only a small fraction of epidemiological ques-
tions are answerable using trials, either for ethical or
resource- and time-related reasons. If comparing like-
with-like is not possible, confounding is inevitable. The
epidemiological mistake, however, is neither confound-
ing nor failing to control for it - these are not fully in our
hands. The mistake is not demonstrating whether com-
Table 2: Missing fieldwork dates and absence of information on ethnicity
A. Fieldwork dates missing in recent reviews
CV cohorts[8] 0/72 0%
BP in UK EM groups -- S. Asians [9] 5/12 42%
BP African [10] 8/14 57%
Trends in obesity in W. African [11] 8/28 29%
Trends in diabetes in W. Africa [12] 7/21 33%
B. Ethnic composition of sample missing
No description or discussion of study in relation to ethnicity or race
CV cohorts [8] 39/72 54%
- USA 6/31 19%
- Europe 33/39 80%
Abbreviations:
CV cardiovascular
BP blood pressure
EM ethnic minorityEmerging Themes in Epidemiology 2009, 6:6 http://www.ete-online.com/content/6/1/6
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parisons are unlikely or likely to be like-for-like. Like mis-
takes 1 and 2 this one is also fundamental, and the
solution is clear cut.
Solution III: Prepare a detailed, prior specification of the data
to be collected in order to demonstrate the similarities and dif-
ferences of comparison populations. Start the analysis with such
detailed comparisons.
The paradox is that the first part of this solution is nearly
always applied in trials (usually table 1), where it is not
essential if the randomisation has worked, but is often
missed out in other study designs, where it is imperative
for data interpretation. The analysis must not proceed
straight to comparisons of risk factor-disease outcome
relationships. The strategy of controlling confounding
within the (usually) multivariable analysis is not suffi-
cient. The reason for this is that the variables entered are
not comprehensive enough and that they are imprecisely
measured and categorised. While the idea of residual con-
founding is known it is not taken seriously enough [17].
How often do authors conclude that the confounders can-
not be controlled and that they have refrained from a mul-
tivariable analysis because causal conclusions cannot be
drawn? That is a rare conclusion, but it should be a com-
mon one.
Example: alcohol
Behaviours are linked to other behaviours, social circum-
stances, age, sex and, of course, diseases. We might there-
fore assume that control of confounding is nigh
impossible when we are looking for associations between
single behaviours and disease outcomes. Instead of that,
we find ourselves in almost endless controversies over
repeated studies demonstrating a variety of associations
that, in the paraphrased words of the late Petr Skrabanek,
can be likened to punching a pillow, whereby the dimple
so formed disappears, at which point we then punch it
again, and again [18]. An example is the association
between alcohol and cardiovascular diseases (CVD),
which has been studied intensively for decades. Thou-
sands of papers have resulted, many of them debating the
evidence, which remains controversial. The study by
Naimi et al. of the potential confounding factors using the
2003 Behavioural Risk Factor Surveillance System is illus-
trative [19]. This large telephone survey permitted exami-
nation of moderate drinkers (men 2 drinks, and women 1
drink, per day) and non-drinkers. The study showed that
27 out of 30 CVD-associated factors were significantly
more prevalent in non-drinkers. Given imprecision in
measurement of confounders, and the many other poten-
tial confounders not included in a telephone survey, is it
not impossible to adjust for confounders in this and sim-
ilar contexts? We need to confront such harsh realities.
Implementing this solution will be a major advance in
interpreting associations.
Mistake 4: Either overstatement or understatement of the 
case for causality based on associations
Overstatement of the case for causality is perennial, much
discussed but not resolved. The problem is that causal rea-
soning is not suitable for an algorithm based approach.
Counter-factual reasoning clarifies the underpinnings of
causal reasoning in epidemiology, but it is theoretical [20-
23]. The closest we come to the counterfactual ideal is tri-
als, which are often not possible for ethical, financial or
time-related reasons. Whenever possible, we should test
out causal hypotheses using trials, but unless we envisage
an age of unethical research, based on human experimen-
tation, we will need to improve our conceptual frame-
works for causal reasoning, particularly for non-trial
epidemiology [20-23]. Causal frameworks in epidemiol-
ogy, often founded on those of other disciplines, [4] have
served us well and deserve to be improved through
research rather than being subjected to the destabilising
effects of attack and counter-attack. The interpretation of
associations needs to be done with great rigour. In rela-
tion to mistake 7, and in my conclusion, I recommend
that we set up a World Council in Epidemiology and Cau-
sality that compiles and evaluates evidence on associa-
tions.
Recently, a new problem has emerged: the understate-
ment of the case for causality. Typically, the authors
declare that a finding is not causal because the data come
from a study of population statistics, or of cross-sectional,
case-control or even cohort design. This arises from the
too simplistic equating of study design with causal reason-
ing. As soon as epidemiologists postulate an association,
never mind demonstrate that one exists, they are some-
where on the pathway of causal analysis. The key question
is where we are on this path, surely the toughest one in
epidemiology, and not one that can be evaded. It is made
even tougher when trials and observational studies con-
tradict each other. There are many good reasons why this
contradiction happens, including the problem of con-
founding, insufficient study size (power) to demonstrate
effects, the possibility that trials have not provided the
duration and amount of exposure to the factor of interest
to lead to an effect, the possibility that the exposure needs
to be at a critical period of life that cannot be mimicked in
a trial (for example, the first year), and, of course, that tri-
als may be done in different kinds of populations to those
studied in observational studies. The problem of causality
is tough and deserves 7 solutions on its own, but I have
chosen one.
Solution IV: Never say that a particular study design cannot
contribute to causality or imply that causality is ensured by your
design, but provide a judgement based on a theoretical perspec-
tive on causality and the world's empirical and theoretical liter-
ature.Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 2009, 6:6 http://www.ete-online.com/content/6/1/6
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Causal understanding may hold firm on the flimsiest of
evidence (or even none that we recognise as epidemiol-
ogy) and be demolished when it derives from large empir-
ical data sets with strong designs (for example, cohorts),
as in the example of HRT above [1,2]. A judgement that
arises from the world's empirical and theoretical literature
demands a discipline to avoid selective reading and rapid
production of 'knowledge'. It demands a return to a
chronological and thorough review as in a PhD, at least
where causality is relevant. Ideas around causation are
likely to be in commentaries and reviews, reports and the-
ses, and introductory and discussion sections of empirical
writings (not in the data in the results section). Such tra-
ditional reviews are surely more suited to in-depth causal
thinking, while systematic reviews are better suited to
quantifying effects, which is no more than the first step in
the long path to declaring an association as causal.
Examples
In 1971 Herbst et al reported that their case-control study
of adenocarcinoma of the vagina in young women
showed an association with maternal use of stilbestrol
[24]. The case group consisted of 8 girls born in New Eng-
land hospitals between 1946 - 1951 and treated between
1966 - 1969. They selected 4 controls per case. The data on
oestrogens given to mothers in the relevant pregnancy
were as follows:
Cases: 7/8
Controls: 0/32
P < 0.00001 (chi squared)
Herbst et al's discussion of their findings was integrated in
terms of epidemiology, biology and clinical medicine.
Their understated but clear-cut conclusion was that "... the
results of this study suggest it is unwise to administer
stilbestrol to women early in pregnancy." They did not
flinch from the challenge because the case group was so
small and the power of the study was low. Equally, they
did not hedge their bets by saying case-control studies do
not produce causal evidence. Let us contrast this with a
recent case-control study.
Ismail et al studied risk factors for myocardial infarction
(MI) in Pakistan in a case-control study [25]. They high-
lighted 8 risk factors in the abstract. Of these, six had odds
ratios (ORs) = 3 and one had an OR = 0.04 (95% CI: 0.01
- 0.35). They concluded:
"...While this study does not establish a cause-effect rela-
tion ... it raises the possibility that several of the associated
factors may be modifiable risk factors ...". "Based on our
findings, we suggest that stringent ...". They then listed six
public health actions based on their risk factors. This
claim that the study design does not permit a causal inter-
pretation, while proceeding to interpret it as causal, is not
good epidemiology. This kind of contradictory reasoning
is common, as shown in the abstracts of the Society for
Epidemiological Research (SER) Conference 2008; exam-
ples include abstract 77 and abstract 378 [26].
Each risk factor needs to be interpreted using an appropri-
ate causal framework, and with reference to the full scien-
tific literature and not just the study's data. Implementing
this solution will be tough, as it requires deep scholarship
that transcends the disciplines that underpin causal
understanding, including biology, pathology, epidemiol-
ogy, statistics, social science and philosophy. Authors may
be pressured by editors, referees and their own institu-
tions into these mistakes on causality, but they remain
responsible for them, so need to resist external pressures.
Mistake 5: Not providing appropriate, and appropriately 
adjusted, absolute and relative measures
Accurate age- and sex-specific rates underpin virtually eve-
rything we value highly in epidemiology. Other data sum-
maries distort the basic epidemiological reality of such
rates. How much time do we spend looking at age- and
sex-specific rates, the building blocks of epidemiology?
How much do we reflect on the distortions of other forms
of data presentation? By choosing one pathway to analysis
- usually relative measures such as the relative risk and the
odds ratio - we close off other options. As a minimum,
however, in recognition of their different messages, we
should give absolute and relative measures. Relative meas-
ures are particularly prone to distortion, and some, such
as the odds ratio, have an inbuilt exaggeration of the asso-
ciation. When we use measures such as ORs we should
ensure they are adjusted to give valid relative measures
[7,27].
The solution is important for epidemiology:
Solution V. Give numbers, rates and comparative measures -
rates hold primacy - and adjust the summary measure if appro-
priate.
Examples
I have emphasised the importance of absolute measures,
especially for health needs assessment, for more than 20
years [28]. The data in table 3, showing how different pri-
orities seem when examined from an absolute compared
to relative risk perspective, continue to surprise both prac-
titioners and researchers [28-30]. The topic remains con-
troversial, especially in the health inequalities arena
[31,32].
The odds ratio is particularly prone to giving results that
are interpreted very differently (and often wrongly) from
the corresponding absolute measure and even the corre-Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 2009, 6:6 http://www.ete-online.com/content/6/1/6
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sponding relative measure. One of many examples that
has drawn critical comment, diverting from the main mes-
sage of the paper, is the work of Barnes and Bero, report-
ing that there was a strong association between
conclusions of review articles and authors' affiliations
with the tobacco industry [33]. The published odds ratio
was 88.4 (95% CI: 16.4 -476.5). The actual data were that
10 of 75 (13.3%) reviews by non-tobacco-affiliated
authors concluded that passive smoking was not harmful
to health. By contrast 29 of 31 (96.1%) reviews by
tobacco-affiliated authors reached this conclusion. The
result from the odds ratio is at odds with actual data, the
prevalence ratio (7.3), and the absolute risk difference
(82.8%). This odds ratio was misinterpreted in the BMJ as
a risk ratio.
The question of what odds ratios measure in case-control
studies has been reviewed recently, with the conclusion
that there is insufficient attention to this issue [34]. My
work with Katherine MacGilchrist and Robin Prescott has
shown that about 50% of the reports of odds ratios in four
major medical journals in the year 2000 were contrary to
epidemiological guidance on their presentation and/or
interpretation (unpublished).
Mistake 6: Making public health recommendations from 
intervention studies that show specific benefits but not do 
not demonstrate general health benefits
We live in a specialist's world. We have cardiologists and
cardiovascular epidemiologists who want to control cardi-
ovascular disorders. But there is no point if there is no net
benefit, for example, if costs and side-effects balance or
even outweigh the benefits. We really need, at least from
a health and health care perspective, a life expectancy and
health expectancy specialism to dominate the scene. Conclu-
sions from research on specific outcomes draw important
but still-limited conclusions, and these should be tested
against the goal of general benefits. Of course, specific
outcomes help in the causal endeavour, where contradic-
tory results are particularly informative, raising questions
about why a particular factor increases one disease or out-
come, while decreasing another. The solution here is obvi-
ous but it has wide-ranging repercussions.
Solution VI. Ensure general benefits (e.g. mortality/morbidity)
exceed the general costs before recommending a public health
or clinical application of a study showing a specific benefit.
Examples
The benefits and costs of HRT in relation to post-meno-
pausal symptoms (beneficial), and cardiovascular disease
and cancer (not beneficial) are well known and were dis-
cussed earlier. Vitamin A at birth reduces mortality, at
least in many Asian populations. However, it does not
seem to produce the same benefits in Guinea-Bissau in
Africa [35-37]. Even in India and Pakistan, the benefits are
contested now, and it will not be beneficial in that setting
for ever [35-37]. A recent study reported that reducing gly-
cated haemoglobin to 6% in the elderly will improve con-
trol of diabetes, much desired by diabetes specialists, but
increase mortality, an unfortunate and unexpected side-
effect [38,39]. By contrast, Gaede et al reported a multifac-
torial intervention for people with diabetes that reduced
non-fatal cardiovascular disease, progression to end-stage
renal failure, and all cause mortality - perhaps an exem-
plary set of outcomes [40].
Following this solution would require larger trials, but in
return the results would be more readily applicable in
population settings. Where a trial can only demonstrate
cause-specific benefits, the authors need to temper their
public health-related conclusions, and consider the possi-
bility of harmful effects that negate the benefits. Further,
the net benefit of an intervention will be dependent on
Table 3: Deaths and SMRs* in male immigrants from the indian sub continent (aged 20 and over; total deaths = 4,352)
By rank order of number of deaths (absolute risk approach) By rank order of SMR (relative risk approach)
Cause Number of Deaths
(SMR)
% of Total deaths Cause SMR 
(Number of Deaths)
% of Total deaths
Ischaemic heart disease 1533 (115) 35.2 Homicide 341 (21) 0.5
Cerebrovascular disease 438 (108) 10.1 Liver and intrahepatic 
bile duct neoplasm
338 (19) 0.4
Bronchitis, emphysema 
and asthma
223 (77) 5.1 Tuberculosis 315 (64) 1.5
Neoplasm of the 
trachea, bronchus and 
lung
218 (53) 5.0 Diabetes mellitus 188 (55) 1.3
Other non-viral 
pneumonia
214 (100) 4.9 Neoplasm of buccal 
cavity and pharynx
178 (28) 0.6
TOTAL 2626 60.3 187 4.3
*Standardised mortality ratios, comparing with the male population of England and Wales, which was by definition 100.
This table is adapted from the version published by Senior and Bhopal (1994) and republished by Bhopal in reference 5.Emerging Themes in Epidemiology 2009, 6:6 http://www.ete-online.com/content/6/1/6
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the mix of conditions in each population. To take a simple
example, if an intervention reduces CHD but increases
cancer, it will probably have net benefits in populations
where CHD is common and cancer rare, but probably net
harm where the opposite applies. In reality, trials will
often not be powered to demonstrate general health ben-
efits (except when these are claimed for the intervention),
so information on harm may need to come from alterna-
tive sources, such as health monitoring data. Public health
recommendations should be tentative until such data are
available.
Mistake 7: Failure by investigators and local health systems 
to utilise study data correctly to benefit health - a need for 
a higher authority providing a unified voice
Interpreting data correctly is among the highest intellec-
tual endeavours in science, perhaps on a par with generat-
ing worthwhile hypotheses. Making health care and
public health recommendations from data extends this
skill. People who combine these skills are rare. The first
skill needs razor sharp thinking on the scientific aspects of
data, the second, similar capacity in relation to politics,
policy, leadership, management and clinical care and
public health. We can fail to apply data in two main ways
- misapplication arising from misinterpretation, and non-
application because the information has been set aside, or
not brought to attention, or ignored.
There is an ethical imperative to act where it is warranted.
Academic epidemiologists are, however, under pressure to
research and teach, not to serve, and service-based clini-
cians and public health staff are under pressure to deliver
services. The two worlds have been parting ways for some
time [41,42]. The solution here is organisational.
Solution VII
Epidemiology needs to provide partners who apply
research, including politicians, doctors, and public health
specialists, with a unified voice. Is it not time for a World
Council in Epidemiology and Causality that provides
authoritative statements on epidemiological evidence and
makes recommendation on when and how epidemiolog-
ical data on associations are ready for application? I return
to this question in the conclusions.
Example
The need for a unified voice is shown by 'Causality: A
Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers', the 1954 adver-
tisement in US newspapers by 14 tobacco companies and
trade associations, recently reprinted in the Lancet [43].
Among the statements about the relationship between
tobacco and lung cancer were these:
"... experiments on mice have given wide publicity to a
theory ...".
"... eminent doctors and research scientists have publicly
questioned the claimed significance of these experi-
ments."
"Distinguished authorities point out: That there is no
agreement among the authorities regarding what the
cause is "
(and 5 more points are made in a similar vein).
There will always be dissenting voices, and controversy
can be exploited easily unless there is an authoritative
voice that is trusted and independent. Such a voice is
required to help apply important causal evidence, even
when there is national hesitancy. Witness, for example,
the failure to apply the knowledge that infants should be
placed on their backs to sleep, to halve the risk of sudden
infant death syndrome. Many European countries failed
to apply this, leading to the unnecessary deaths of thou-
sands of infants in Europe alone [44].
Conclusion
There are numerous guidelines, published over some dec-
ades, on how to undertake and publish epidemiological
research [45,46], available at the EQUATOR website http:/
/www.equator-network.org/index.aspx?o=1032; accessed
14/8/08. These enjoy interesting acronyms such as CON-
SORT, STROBE, PRISMA, etc. Journals provide detailed
guidance to authors and referees. Books summarise these
for students. So why do we not apply the guidance? I think
that our human frailties, the innate limitations of our sci-
ence, insufficient education and training, and pressures of
time and resources combine, making it hard to avoid the
kind of fundamental mistakes illustrated in this paper. If
so, the lessons are that:
1. we need to pay attention to the development of eth-
ical and rigorous epidemiologists of high integrity
[5,47] with high-level conceptual, theoretical and
technical skills;
2. we make the innate limitations of our discipline
more explicit;
3. we reorganise our scientific endeavour to make a
collective, focused and more unified approach possi-
ble.
The seventh solution asks us to create a unified voice by
pooling our intellectual resources, and creating a new glo-
bal authority, to which I have given a provisional title. A
World Council on Epidemiology and Causality could,
however, dampen innovation. Alternatively, it could has-
ten advances, and counter the onslaught of undigested
associations that bewilder us and will be multiplying asEmerging Themes in Epidemiology 2009, 6:6 http://www.ete-online.com/content/6/1/6
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computerised data mining, data linkage, genetic epidemi-
ology, and grand-scale epidemiology on millions of study
participants become commonplace. (The analogy here is
to do for associations and causality what the Cochrane
collaboration, and the UK National Institute for Clinical
Excellence, is doing for effectiveness of interventions.)
Epidemiologists guard their academic freedom zealously
and are mistrustful, sceptical people, particularly in rela-
tion to institutions. Nonetheless, to counter criticisms
about false findings [18], advance epidemiology, and
properly engage the public, we need to try out such a
Council, learn from the experience and find workable,
collaborative, global solutions to the kinds of problems
illustrated here.
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